Peter J. May and Linda Lawrance Noson
Funding for preparation for this paper has been
provided by a United States Geological Survey grant to Peter May
(Agreement 14-08-0001-G2065). The contents of this paper are not
necessarily endorsed by the United States Geological Survey.
Table of Contents
[Back] [Abstract] [Rationale For and Against a Regional
Cascadia Effort] [Rationale For and Against a Subduction
Focus for a Regional Effort] [Potential Cascadia Risk Reduction and Preparedness Strategies]
[Considering Potential Organizational
Structures] [Necessary
Steps Toward a Regional Effort] [Examples
of Future Risk-Reduction Strategies and Organizations for the
Cascadia Zone] [End]
Abstract [Top]
Interest in Cascadia -- including parts of Northern
California, Washington, Oregon, and British Columbia -- earthquake
risks has been fostered by several developments in recent years.
The emerging consensus among the scientific community of the potential
for a great earthquake has led to increased attention to interface
(subduction) events. The recent Mendocino earthquakes and definition
of the "Seattle fault" serve as reminders that the Cascadia
zone contains a variety of earthquake sources. This discussion
paper addresses issues surrounding creation of a Cascadia regional
risk-reduction and preparedness effort.
At issue in determining the desirability of a regional
effort are two basic questions: (1) the extent to which a regional-Cascadia
effort is appropriate; and (2) the extent to which interface (subduction)
events should be a focal point for a regional effort. An affirmative
response to the first issue requires agreement that there is sufficient
commonalty of earthquake hazards and risk-reduction needs to warrant
a regional effort. An affirmative response to the second issue
requires evidence that interface events are credible and their
impacts sufficiently differentiated from other seismic events
to warrant special risk-reduction and preparedness efforts.
We believe there is a strong case to be made
for a regional-Cascadia risk-reduction and preparedness effort.
However, the case for an exclusive and/or primary focus on interface
(subduction) events is more mixed at this time. These conclusions
are based on the following discussion of:
(1) potential rationale for and arguments against a regional-Cascadia
effort;
(2) the role that subduction-zone events might play in such a
regional effort;
(3) potential risk-reduction strategies for the region;
(4) relevant regional organizations to consider; and
(5) necessary steps for a fuller assessment of the appropriateness
and feasibility of a Cascadia-regional effort.
Rationale For and Against
a Regional Cascadia Effort [Top]
The primary rationale for the formation of a Cascadia
regional-reduction effort is the exposure of the region to a common
set of earthquake hazards. Just as the Central United States Earthquake
Consortium was formed to address a common multi-state earthquake
threat (the New Madrid fault zone), the Cascadia zone contains
a common set of earthquake sources. However, unlike the central-United
States, the Cascadia zone contains multiple hazard sources:
- Potentially catastrophic interface (subduction) earthquakes
accompanied by prolonged damaging aftershock sequences, pronounced
elevation changes, local tsunamis, and unique damage patterns;
- Large, deep intraplate earthquakes related to the stretching
of the downward moving plate, causing regional damage;
- Shallow, crustal earthquakes with uncertain distribution
and relationships to each other, including a newly defined
"Seattle fault"; capable of major damage and
- Volcanic eruptions related to the Cascadia zone.
Any of these hazard sources within the Cascadia
zone present regional risks crossing state and national (United
States-British Columbia) boundaries. As such, a second rationale
for a Cascadia regional effort is that damaging earthquakes within
this zone are likely to be regional in nature. A regional risk-reduction
effort could facilitate intergovernmental and regional response
planning, cooperation in regional mitigation planning (e.g., for
lifelines), dissemination of information (e.g., preparedness and
mitigation), and cooperation in information sharing about site-specific
events. There is a presumed economy-of-scale stemming from the
fact that similar impacts are to be addressed throughout the region.
Among other things, the foci for a regional effort could consist
of:
- Development of common sets of planning assumptions, based
on an understanding of the Cascadia earthquake sources. Viewing
the threat from a single-state or substate perspective has
proven to provide an incomplete basis for planning. For example,
based on only the available historic record in Oregon, the
earthquake threat was thought to be minimal. A greater understanding
of Cascadia source zones has led to a rethinking of the Oregon
earthquake threat.
- Regional response and recovery planning in order to provide
stronger capabilities of dealing with earthquakes in the region.
- A regional strategy for risk-reduction. A regional focus
provides opportunities for linking risk-reduction efforts
across states (including British Columbia) in order to avoid
sub-optimal risk reduction efforts. It also has the advantage
of providing opportunities to learn from other jurisdictions'
risk-reduction in the region that would not normally be addressed
through more localized risk-reduction programs.
- Earthquake specialists within state government, local government,
and professional associations are currently cognizant of these
issues, but nonetheless significant gaps exist in the ability
to communicate and effectively use knowledge about earthquake
impacts in the Cascadia zone. These gaps are both ones of
inadequate translation of information and ones of a lack of
willingness to address earthquake hazards. There is both a
"need for users" and a demand for better meeting
existing "users needs." Filling these gaps provides
one primary rationale for a regional-Cascadia effort.
In concept, a Cascadia regional risk-reduction
and preparedness effort makes much sense. The arguments against
such an effort are largely practical ones stemming from questions
about the ability to launch and sustain such an effort. Moving
forward with a Cascadia effort implies judgments that: (1) the
existing state, local, and nongovernmental risk reduction and
preparedness planning effort are not capable of addressing regional
events; and (2) there is sufficient willingness or ability, given
likely resources, to mount an effective Cascadia-regional effort.
In assessing the feasibility of any regional effort,
several factors must be confronted:
- The uncertainty associated with Cascadia earthquake sources
and the likely changes in the scientific understanding of
interface events in future years. This necessitates any strategy
be capable of incorporating new information within reasonable
timeframes;
- The varied capabilities and willingness of existing state,
local, and nongovernmental organizations to advocate (or for
that matter address) earthquake issues. Within this region
there is considerable difference in these regards among state
emergency management organizations, and among different professional
organizations (e.g., active structural engineers' associations
versus relatively inactive professional planning organizations);
- Differing constraints and opportunities within states in
the region brought about by different mandates governing land
use, building practices, and development patterns.
- The widely varied risk reduction prospects among local jurisdictions
in the region. (This variation is documented by Peter May's
study of local earthquake related policies and practices of
43 major jurisdictions in the Puget Sound and Portland areas.)
- The varied willingness and abilities of the professional
design community within the region. (This variation is documented
by Peter May's and Nancy Stark's interviews with design professionals
in the Pacific Northwest.)
- Limited resources available for sustaining risk-reduction
and preparedness efforts. Each of the states in the region
(California, Oregon, Washington) are experiencing noteworthy
budget restrictions and/or reductions, suggesting future state
funding for any initiatives will be limited if non-existent.
Rationale For and Against
a Subduction Focus for a Regional Effort [Top]
A second issue in considering a Cascadia effort
is the extent to which potentially catastrophic interface (subduction)
events should be a dominant focus of regional risk reduction and
preparedness efforts. Such emphasis requires a consensus that
interface events are credible and their impacts sufficiently differentiated
from other seismic events to warrant special risk-reduction and
preparedness efforts.
In comparison to crustal and intraplate events,
an interface (subduction) event potentially introduces:
-
- More geographically widespread impacts;
- Sustained aftershock sequences which imply different ways
of dealing with immediate response and personal preparedness;
- Greater impacts on distributed systems like lifelines and
transportation systems, stemming from the broader geographical
area that is affected;
- Local tsunamis capable of inundating coastal regions, with
relatively little warning;
- A different set of damage patterns to structures, relating
to longer periods (e.g., 10-12 story nonductile concrete buildings)
and longer duration shaking;
- Increased number of ground failures due to the longer duration
shaking and more widespread impacts of a subduction-type event.
Several arguments against a subduction focus for
a Cascadia effort need to be more fully evaluated: (1) subduction
interface events are not sufficiently credible (unlikely argument);
(2) their impacts are not sufficiently unique to warrant special
attention, since preparing for other seismic events addresses
subduction zone events (yes and no); and (3) attention to subduction-type
events would supplant attention to other, perhaps more likely
in the short-term events.
Although the interface events clearly raise important
questions about the scale of event to plan for and unique damage
patterns (e.g., tsunamis, aftershocks, differences in shaking
periods), most of the above impacts are more differences of degree
than in kind when compared with the impacts of intraplate and
crustal sources. As such, we do not feel that the interface
(subduction) events are sufficiently differentiated for them to
have a dominant focus for a Cascadia risk-reduction effort at
this time. Such events should be considered as one of several
credible earthquake sources within the Cascadia zone.
Potential Cascadia Risk
Reduction and Preparedness Strategies [Top]
Discussions to date of a regional risk-reduction
and preparedness program have raised various issues about appropriate
organizational structures, like the Central United States Earthquake
Consortium (CUSEC) in the mid-West, the Bay Area Earthquake Preparedness
Program (BAREPP) in the San Francisco Bay Area, and similar organizations
created to promote risk reduction and preparedness in other parts
of the county. In focusing on the appropriate organization for
the Cascadia zone, the discussions to date have tended to beg
the question of the functions any such organization will perform.
It makes sense to first address the relevant tasks then talk about
appropriate organizations to accomplish them.
The assumed, though not explicitly stated, purpose
of a Cascadia regional organization is to improve risk-reduction
and preparedness in the region. Thinking about an appropriate
organization requires first thinking about a strategy to achieve
that purpose. Prospective risk-reduction strategies range from
a relatively passive one of hazards-information dissemination
(essentially the status quo) to more active efforts to seek policy
reforms or to influence practices. Although these strategies are
not mutually exclusive, limited resources dictate that choices
must be made as to which strategies to emphasize. The primary
issues in choosing between the different strategies are the focal
points within the region and the mechanisms for promoting risk
reduction. These differences in foci are summarized in the chart
accompanying this discussion paper.
Each of several selected potential risk-reduction
strategies are outlined in the remainder of this section. (For
further discussion see the forthcoming chapter in the Pacific
Northwest Professional paper by Peter May.)
Disseminate Hazards Information (status quo).
This strategy consists of dissemination of new scientific information
about earthquake hazards in the region through professional publications,
newsletters, and meetings. Such information could be translated
into hazards maps prepared at a scale that would show information
relevant to at least the major jurisdictions in the region. Demonstration
uses of geographical information systems that translate hazards
into the risks posed for people or structures might also be undertaken.
It might also contain an expanded (mass) public information program,
such as the newspaper insert undertaken in the San Francisco Bay
area.
One strength of hazards-information dissemination
is that it is fairly easy to implement. Several activities are
already being jointly undertaken by the U. S. Federal Emergency
Management Agency and the U. S. Geological Survey. The key uncertainty
for this strategy concerns who is likely to act upon the new information.
Although the details depend on both the substance and the form
of the information, the variety of situations faced by local jurisdictions
within the region suggests that only a few categories of cities
and counties are either capable of or willing to act upon such
information without further external efforts to influence risk-reduction
practices.
Other potentially responsive audiences are attentive
professional groups such as the structuralengineers associations
of Washington and Oregon. These groups effectively translate the
information into new engineering or design practices. Depending
on the extent of change in risk assumptions and the credibility
of the information, the professional groups might use the information
to lobby state building agencies and private code-writing authorities
for changes in building standards.
Mass public education, or more focused educational
programs focusing for example on schools, could also be appropriate.
However, it is clear from previous experience with risk communication
that any such educational efforts will not be effective unless:
(a) there is greater certainty and specificity about earthquake
impacts within the region; (b) specific actions that individuals
(or target groups) can and should take can be effectively communicated,
and (c) such information be communicated in a way so as not to
be alarmist and therefore discounted. Public awareness of earthquakes
within this region appears to be surprisingly high due to previous
media coverage of the potential for earthquakes. As such, awareness
per se is not much of an issue.
Clearly, better hazards and risk information is
necessary. However, dissemination of risk-reduction information,
without other efforts to influence policies or practices, will
likely produce limited reduction of earthquake-hazards risk. The
more capable cities and counties may make use of the information.
However, little likely will happen in the remaining jurisdictions.
Some structural engineers, geotechnical consultants, and others
who design structures may use the new information as part of their
practice while others will find the information to be irrelevant
or too esoteric to be of much use. Parts of the general public
will find publicity about subduction events interesting. However.
unless the above conditions for information transfer are met,
they will not act to increase preparedness or reduce risks.
Seek Mandate Revisions. This strategy consists
of directly seeking revisions in state-level building-code. land-use,
and lifeline-related mandates or licensing. The specific changes
sought will depend upon the nature of the information developed
from the scientific research. These revisions might include new
seismic-zone delineation, new design standards, special code provisions
for particular categories of buildings, or better delineation
of seismic hazards within land-use mandates. Building codes could
be changed either by state amendments or through the code-revision
process of the International Conference of Building Officials.
Neither procedure would be easy, and both would require considerable
technical justification.
Because state building-codes and land-use mandates
establish the foundation for local risk-reduction policies, the
mandate-revision strategy could lead to desired changes in local
policies. Moreover, the changes would be more or less uniform
within each of the states. However, this strategy for influencing
risk reduction has three main limitations. The first is the difficulty
of achieving changes, particularly significant ones, in state
building codes, private codes, or state land-use mandates. The
second limitation is that changed policies will only address future
development and construction. Even with substantiation of sizable
risks, retroactive state-level policies concerning seismic-risk
review or retrofit of existing, potentially hazardous buildings
are very unlikely to be enacted in Oregon or Washington. (California's
existing legislation related to hazardous buildings provides an
avenue for addressing these concerns in Northern California.)
The third limitation is that although local policies closely mirror
state mandates, local practices till vary considerably. Implementation
of the policies and the discretion used by building and land-use
officials depends on the broader political and economic environment.
Influence Local Government Practices. This
strategy consists of efforts to influence the practices of emergency
services, building, and planning departments in carrying out state
mandates and local policies, and in promoting earthquake risk-reduction
and preparedness. This influence might entail providing jurisdiction-specific
seminars on seismic risk, preparing guidelines for using discretionary
building-code and land-use judgments, providing technical assistance
in land-use planning or construction-plan review, or funding geologists
or structural engineers as part of local staffs. These actions
could be targeted to specific jurisdictions or classes of jurisdictions.
This strategy has several strengths. The targeting
of assistance would respond to the varied situations of jurisdictions
in this region. The emphasis on practice, as opposed to policy,
would influence important discretionary judgments concerning such
things as renovation of buildings. Also, several model risk-reduction
efforts could be developed that could potentially be transferred
to other jurisdictions.
The limitations of this strategy result from the
constraints imposed by state mandates on local exceptions to those
mandates. The Washington state building code allows local jurisdictions
to enact stronger provisions than state mandates with appropriate
state-level review. The Oregon state building code does not permit
exceptions. Therefore, the effectiveness of this strategy is a
function of the amount of discretion that exists within existing
codes. This strategy would improve risk-reduction efforts the
most among those jurisdictions in which current risk-reduction
efforts are the weakest.
Influence Private Professional Practices.
This strategy consists of efforts to influence the practices of
the private-sector engineering and building-design community.
This influence might entail providing special seminars on seismic
risk and earthquake engineering, funding creation of special guidelines
by professional associations, or providing some other form of
professional development opportunities. These actions could be
targeted to different types of engineers and building-design professionals.
The strength of this strategy is in the prospective
direct influence on the design and engineering recommendations
of this community in reducing earthquake risks. The results are
likely to be greatest in those sectors that rely extensively on
the judgments of design and engineering professionals, such as
the utilities and ports. Indirect benefits of changes in practices
or knowledge might lead to interest in lobbying for code changes.
Obvious implementation difficulties for this strategy
are identifying and reaching appropriate professionals and then
convincing them of the need for changes in practice. If these
difficulties were overcome, the main limits to the effectiveness
of this strategy are the constraints under which the design and
engineering community practices its professions. Without code
changes, competitive pressures and client desire to reduce costs
may restrict the extent to which practices exceed minimum code
requirements. The main beneficiaries of this strategy may be the
professionals and supportive clients who already are doing the
most to address earthquake risks. Insurance companies and financial
institutions could potentially be important in endorsing or requiring
new seismic design practices. However, competition and other factors
have limited the influence of insurance companies and financial
institutions in stimulating stronger risk-reduction efforts.
Considering
Potential Organizational Structures [Top]
The form of a Cascadia organization should follow
from and not pre-determine the desired Cascadia risk-reduction
and preparedness strategy. As shown in the last column of the
attachment, each of the above risk-reduction and preparedness
strategies implies a different set of organizational arrangements.
The arrangements also differ in terms of the implied scale of
activity. The organizations fit one of three types of models:
A fairly lean clearinghouse for information transfer
and education. The clearinghouse would serve as a conduit for
hazard and risk-reduction information to be given to relevant
state lead agencies. States would in turn undertake the main dissemination
functions to relevant groups within each state. An example of
this clearing house function is the Wasatch Forum newsletter
and associated clearinghouse functions that involve the University
of Utah, Utah Geological and Mineral Survey, and Utah State Department
of Emergency Management.
A newly created, or revised, regional entity with
several potential emphases, depending on the risk-reduction strategy
that is selected. This could consist of a regional information
and transfer entity (perhaps based at a university, or within
a state geological survey), a regional-like BAREPP or CUSEC emphasizing
efforts to influence local-level policy and practice, or a private
association (e.g., EERI) or newly funded entity charged with carrying
out technical assistance functions related to subduction-type
earthquakes.
A network of existing organizations with core staffing
(or funding) for carrying out relevant tasks. The membership of
the network would depend upon the particular strategy selected:
a network of state policy influentials for influencing state policy
(e.g., modified Western States Seismic Policy Council, or a variant
of CUSEC); or a network of key influentials among professional
organizations representing members of the Cascadia design community
(e.g., a regional-like Building Seismic Safety Council).
Working through development of an appropriate organizational
structure clearly requires more detailed consideration of available
(and potential) resources, interest on the part of relevant organizations,
and ability to recruit and maintain strong staff. None of these
are simple undertakings and each is critical to the success of
any such organization. The track record so far in this region
with respect to creating and sustaining these functions is not
good.
Necessary Steps Toward a
Regional Effort [Top]
Development of a regional-Cascadia risk-reduction
and preparedness effort entails a series of actions for which
definition of an organizational structure is but one supporting
element. We define the necessary steps, in order of undertaking,
as follows:
- An assessment of existing risk-reduction efforts in the
region in order to identify gaps in risk-reduction and prospects
for reducing those gaps, as an additional component of the
targeting of risk-reduction activities;
- Development of a long-term risk-reduction and preparedness
strategy for the region, as illustrated by the types of strategies
noted in this discussion document;
- Re-orientation of federal funding so that extramurally funded
activities are consistent with the above needs;
- Development of mechanisms for continued monitoring of the
status of risk reduction and preparedness within the region;
- Initiation and support for an appropriate regional clearinghouse,
entity, or network for carrying out the desired risk reduction
strategy, as illustrated by the types of organizations noted
in this discussion document; and,
- A new set of vulnerability studies focusing on identifying
vulnerable geographic areas, sectors of the population and
economy that would serve to inform the targeting of future
risk-reduction activities.
It is important to note that the prospects for some
form of national earthquake insurance do not alleviate these needs.
Any mitigation component of a national program will place extensive
requirements for creating the type of information and technical
assistance described here.
Examples of Future Risk-Reduction
Strategies and Organizations for the Cascadia Zone
[Top]
Strategy and Target groups Strengths Limitations Potential
examples Organizations
Disseminate Widely-dissemina Easily - Only the more -Clearinghouse for
hazards ted information implemented, capable information
information (targeting although jurisdictions and transfer &
(status quo) possible among requires professionals education, leaving
selected stronger will act on actual education
Workshops; jurisdictions, translation of information. up to states
publication of professionals, information - Public -Regional
hazard maps, or public than currently awareness already information
public education. groups) exists reasonably high, transfer and
motivating public education effort
to act is more (in place of state
difficult efforts)
Seek mandate State agencies, Addresses key -Limited to new -Network of state
revisions - public and leverage points buildings or influentials who
private for influencing development (as a advocate policy
Develop and code-writing risk reduction, practical matter, changes at state
advocated changes authorities -- dovetails with except possibly level (perhaps
in state through current federal California); through Western
building-code, provision of efforts with -Long time frames States Seismic
emergency information and respect to code to accomplish Policy
management, funding revision and change due to Association),
land-use technical lifelines length of mandate potentially
mandates, and assistance. revision cycles modeled after
guidelines -Presumes local CUSEC
governing practices will -Regional
lifeline siting change as the technical
and construction. result of mandate assistance and
changes. advocacy group,
focusing on state
issues (newly
created entity, or
staff within
existing regional
agency)
Influence local Local building Can target -Limited -Regional
government officials, jurisdictions resources of many technical
practices emergency with greatest jurisdictions may assistance and
(including managers, and needs; does not limit willingness advocacy
special planners; require policy to participate organization,
districts) public changes. -Changes in some potentially
Workshops, staff utilities and practices (e.g., modeled after
funding, ports. building BAREPP or aspects
demonstration regulation) may of CUSEC (with
programs, require statutory focus on local
technical changes jurisdictions)
assistance.
Influence private Architects, -Can target -Limited ability -An existing
professional engineers specific to reach less organization
practices (design and groups; does interested within the region
engineering not require professionals; funded to take the
Workshops, community). state or local -Economic lead in
publication of endorsement considerations transferring
guidebooks, -These groups, may limit ability information and
technical in turn, can to influence advocating
assistance. influence state practice professional
policy (e.g., -Influence on practices (e.g.,
with respect to state policy is EERI)
building rather indirect -Network created
codes). among professional
organizations,
with emphasis on
seismic
considerations
(e.g., a regional
BSSC)
Table of Contents
[Back] [Abstract] [Rationale For and Against a Regional
Cascadia Effort] [Rationale For and Against a Subduction
Focus for a Regional Effort] [Potential Cascadia Risk Reduction and Preparedness Strategies]
[Considering Potential Organizational
Structures] [Necessary
Steps Toward a Regional Effort] [Examples
of Future Risk-Reduction Strategies and Organizations for the
Cascadia Zone] [End]